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I. Introduction

In Puh1am's seminal article I'The Meaning of Meaning" (TMM)1
several central issues to the philosophy of mind are critiqued using
an extended thought experiment. For this paper, at least, the issues
relevant to my ar guments will be those that deal with men tal content.
My interest in this essay is not the validity of most of Putnam's views;
these ideas have been widely accepted as correct. Instead, I want to
focus on the expansion of these ideas, specifically, the ones advanced
in the work of Tyler Burge. For Putnam, mental content is separable
into two parts, 'wide' and 'narrow.'l Thus, while we can imagine that
we share the identical mental states, brain constitution, etc., with our
Twin Earth doppelganger, the external substance to which we refer
when we say "water," is different. For me, here, now, water is H20;
for me on Twin Earth water is XYZ.
It is certainly the case that for Putnam my doppelganger and I
share the same 'narrow' content, in that we are similar in all relevant
respects internally. However, the externalities that we find ourselves
surrounded by are different in one important enough respect, (H20
v. XYZ), thus our 'wide' content is different. I use 'narrow' to refer
to individual mental states that do not presuppose or depend in
anyway on the external world, and 'wide' to designate those states
that do. In part II of my paper I will argue that Burge's articles
1I1ndividualism and the Mental" (1M), and "Other Bodies" (OB),
show the impossibility of narrow mental contents. In section III I
shall explain why Burge views Putnam as being unable to see this
problem. On Burge's reading, Putnam's claim that natural kind
terms are indexical obscures this error. Finally, I will address Burge's
concerns about the inexorably referential nature of all mental con
tents. Putnam seems to believe that not all mental contents 'fix' [refer
to, designate, pick out, depend on] external objects. For Burge, "all
of an agent's intentional states involving natural kinds do presupHerrington is a 1999 graduate of Denison University. He will be pursuing a J.D.
at Washington University in the fall.
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pose entities other than the agent" (TMM 118). Thus, we should
rightfully conclude that there could not be narrow mental content
and acknowledge thatthe Twin Earth examples take us further away
from any sort of individualism, (e.g. meanings are to be found in the
mental contents of an isolated individual), than Putnam originally
thought. The remainder of this essay will deal, then, with two related
problems. The first will be how the Twin Earth examples exclude the
possibility of narrow content. The second will be the confusion that
occurs in Pumam's liThe Meaning of Meaning" with respect to the
idea of narrow contents and his discussion of indexicality. I shall
conclude with a brief Twin Earth example that is intended to show
the impossibility of narrow content, and the necessary role of both
the external world and the social universe.
II. liThe Meaning ofMeaning"

Putnam is eager to show that the traditional conception of
meaning rests on two fundamentally false principles. These are:
A. That knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being
in a certain psychological state;
B. That the meaning of a term (intension) determines its exten
sion; E.g. sameness of intension entails sameness of extension.
Through his Twin Earth examples, Putnam shows that it is not
the case that being in a certain psychological state determines a
term's meaning for an individual. I will very briefly rehash the gist
of Putnam's arguments against principle A. We can plausibly imag
ine a world that is qualitatively and quantitatively identical to ours,
excepting the simple fact that on this other Earth the molecular
structure of water is not H20, it is XYZ. We can also imagine that we
have a duplicate on this other Earth who has the same thought
processes, feelings, and mental contents as we do. However, it is the
case that on Twin Earth when our duplicate talks about water, she is
talking about XfZ, and here on Earth we are talking about H20. So,
while this is indeed a thin sketch of Putnam's article, we can see that
for Putnam, principle A is admittedly false. One cannot determine
the meaning of a term by examining the psychological state of the
individual using the term.
For this paper, the interesting difference between Putnam and
Burge will be shown to rest on their different revisions of principle
B. To make this clearer, I will differentiate between the conclusions
that Pumam reaches and those that Burge accepts. Burge is not going
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to accept Putnam's revision of B. That is, Burge will not agree with
Putnam that Glenn on Earth and Glenn on Twin Earth merely refer
to whichever extended body (H20, XYZ respectively) is present
when they talk about water. That is, while Putnam thinks intension
can be the same and extension different, Burge argues that if exten
sion differs intension must be different as well. Burge goes on to say
that Glenn Earth and Glenn Twin Earth must have different mental content
even though their respective physical constitutions are identical. It is
not the case, for Burge, that there can be sameness of intension but a
difference in extension. Thus, while Putnam believes he can allow
for Glenn E and Glenn TE to have identical mental contents, but refer
to different external objects, Burge will show this to presuppose the
existence of narrow mental contents. The real crux issue in this paper
will be how Burge brings Putnam's arguments to fruition. It is to this
set of issues that I now turn.

III. "Individualism and the Mental"
The structures and results of "Individualism and the Mental"
parallel closely Putnam's seminal essay. Individualism, as Burge
construes it, is the belief that by examining an agent's mental struc
tures, thoughts, beliefs, etc. independently of her external/ social
enviromnentwe can come to know the content of the agent's thought.
The very existence of this concept is the target of Burge's arguments,
and after some explanatory notes we can sketch out the thought
example and its effect on the status of mental content.
To begin Burge makes a series of specifications to eliminate
confusion with regard to the sort of mental states he wants to discuss.
What immediately becomes crucial is the notion of obliquely occur
ring content clauses. These are sentential expressions that contain a
non-interchangeable referent. That is, to use the example Burge
gives II [F]rom the facts that water is H20 and Bertrand thought that
water is not fit to drink, it does not follow that Bertrand thought that
H20 is not fit to drink" (1M 538). Bertrand's expression contains an
obliquely occurring content clause because one cannot substitute the
notion of'water' with the notion of 'H20' and preserve the meaning
of the original sentence. Burge continues with this idea by stating
that "Mentalistic discourse containing obliquely occurring expres
sions has traditionally been called intentional discourse" (ibid.). Burge
goes on to say "obliquely occurring expressions in content-clauses
are a primary means of identifying a person's intentional mental
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states or events" (ibid.). I will continue by explaining why, in talking
about mental content this way, Burge opens the way to discrediting,
at least, principle A from before.
To discredit mental content in a narrow sense, Burge first makes
a number of important distinctions. He defines a 'narrow' content
psychological state as one in which being in said state" does not
presuppose a proposition P if it does not logically entail P" (OB 150).
Further, he says "being in a psychological state in the narrow sense
is to be in a state correctly ascribable in terms of a content-clause
which contains no expressions in a position which admits of existen
tial generalization and which is not in any sense de reo De dicta non
relational propositional attitudes would thus be psychological states
in the narrow sense" (ibid.). I take this to mean that, on Burge's
reading, Putnam thinks these narrow content states do not relate in
anyway to objects outside the agent. It is with this understanding of
narrow content that Burge goes on to question Putnam's claim that
these attitudes fail to 'fix' anything outside of the subject. Here again
we need to qualify a term, and I am using 'fix' in the sense of refer to,
or pick out.
To see why these'narrow' content states cannot be narrow, as we
have defined them above, let us return to the H20jXYZ example
from before. Gle111Lrn, when he wonders if there is any water around,
is obviously not talking about H20. The content of his mental state,
regardless of whether he knows what the molecular structure of
'twater' is, does not contain H20. Nor does it seem possible that it
ever could. Both Glenn E and Gle111Lrn "will have numerous proposi
tional attitudes correctly attributable with the relevant natural kind
terms in oblique position" (ibid.). If Glenn on Twin Earth expresses
the desire for a glass of 'water' [H20], as opposed to 'twater' [XYZ],
or any other attitude containing the concept of 'water,' e.g. that this
stream contains 'water,' he seems to have a number of false beliefs.
Why would we want to attribute largely false beliefs to our Twin
Earth duplicate and largely true ones to ourselves? This appears
immediately counterintuitive. The best response to this dilemma
seems to be to rule out narrow content. Putnam understates the role
that the environment and social context seem to play in determining
the propositional attitudes of both Glenns. If the original Twin Earth
account is correct then it appears that we have to assume a number
of umeasonable premises. We have to account for how Gle11l1.rn
could ever obtain the concept of 'water', (not 'twater') without
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having been exposed to it. We have to account for why we would
want to violate the principle of charity2 by attributing largely false
belief to Gle~if we took him to hold beliefs about 'water.'
Hopefully, Burge~ s revision of mental content and propositional
attitudes will also lead us to a refutation, notably different from
Putnam~ s, of principle B as well. I shall go on to discuss the arthritis
thought experiment that Burge uses, and show how this will pave the
way for Burge's strengthening of the force of Putnam's Twin Earth
arguments.
Burge begins his thought experiment by talking about
counterfactual situations. We can imagine that"A given person has
a large number of attitudes commonly attributed with content
clauses containing 'arthritis' in oblique occurrence u (ibid.). This
person would have many ideas about what arthritis was, what it
caused, how itfelt, etc. And Burge supposes that this person, let' scalI
him Hank, thinks he has developed arthritis in the thigh. Actually,
Hank's physician tells him that one cannot develop arthritis in the
thigh. Hank is sort of surprised, distraught, and" goes on to ask what
might be wrong with his thigh" (1M 539). The counterfactual
involves Hank2 who while being identical physically, qualitatively,
and historically, goes to his doctor to express his concern that he has
develop ed arthritis in the thigh, and is answered by the coun terfactual
doctor in the affirmative. What does this imply? Burge thinks that
it means that "arthritis," for Hank2's world, is used to signify not only
the conventional cases of rheumatoid joint-inflammation, but other
pain producing rheumatoid ills as well.
Thus, "In the counterfactual situation the patient lacks some-
probably a11--of the attitudes commonly associated with content
clauses containing 'arthritis' in oblique occurrence. He lacks the
occurrent thoughts or beliefs that he has had arthritis in the thigh,
that he has had arthritis for years, ... and so on" (ibid.). The difference
in the counterfactual world is not only that the theoretical definition
of'arthri tis' is different, but that the social praxis involving the term
is as well. Hank zcomes to his (correct?!) conception concerning the
usage of arthritis, not under his own steam, but rather through
experience involving a social environment in which arthritis is used
as a blanket term to apply to all sorts of rheumatoid ailments. Hank
in our world learns to apply arthritis correctly not only through his
actual encounter with joint pain, or being in the psychological state
of having arthritis, but also through his myriad encounters with
l
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others, especially those who can correctly use'arthritis,' e.g. physi
cians. This example of Burge's should be seen to undermine indi
vidualism [principle A from before]. Meanings are not in the hands
of an isolated individual, or, as Putnam himself would put it "Mean
ings just ain't in the head."
What 1have hoped to show in the elucidation of Burge's thought
experiment is that while being similar to Putnam's in its dismissal of
principle A the implications go beyond natural kinds and demon
strate the problems with the Twin Earth example. For Burge, we do
not have to construe concepts like"arthritis" as natural kinds to get
the medicinal effects of the thought experiment. As 1said before, for
GlennE and Gle11Itrn, having identical mental contents and yet refer
ring to different external objects is not a valid option. If it is the case
that GlennE and Gle~ refer to different extended objects, then they
cannot have identical mental contents. "Social content infects even
the distinctively mental features of mentalistic attributions.
[Nobody's] intentional mental phenomena are insular. Every [one]
is a piece of the social continent, a part of the social main" (1M 545).
IV. Another trip to Twin Earth, and those "Other Bodies"

I said at the beginning of this paper that I would show how
Putnam's Twin Earth examples are not compatible with the idea of
narrow mental content. It is to this task that I now tum. I will permit
Burge to speak for himself in explaining the main problem with
Putnam's thought experiment. "What I reject is the view that mental
states and processes individuated by such obliquely occurring ex
pressions can be understood purely in terms of non-intentional
characterizations of the individual subject's acts, skills, dispositions,
physical states, functional states, and effects of environmental stimuli
on him ... or the activities of his fellows" (OB 143). Further, to clarify
how this differs from our characterization of Putnam, in changing
tl1e external environment of the subject we modify the contents of his
thoughts. While Putnam has argued that sameness in intension does
not entail sameness in extension, d. principle B, according to Burge,
sameness in intension is impossible if there is difference in extension.
The confusion that Putnam's claims about the indexicality of natural
kind terms creates will dissipate once we see that Burge denies that
there is indexicality in terms like 'water.'
We all know about the Twin Earth example. GlennE and Gle11l.'1.rn
are identical in all respects. Their respective worlds are as welt
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exceptthat'water on Earth is H2O and twater/ as Burge refers to the
water on Twin Earth is XYZ. However, to paraphrase Burge, when
Glenna thinks or says 'There is some water within twenty miles, I
hope,' Glenn", must reciprocally think the same sentence. YetI for
Putnam this entails that Glenna is thinking about Iwater' [H20] and
Glenn", is thinking about ItwaterI [XYZ]. And, as Putnam does not
note the differences [in the actual physical constitutions of 'water'
and 'twater/] affect oblique occurrences in that-clauses that provide
the contents of their mental states and eventslf (OB 145). What Burge
is getting at is that on Earth, Glenn is hoping that he can discover
some H20 ['water']. Counterfactually, on Twin Earth, Glenn is
hoping he can discover some XYZ etwaterT IIThat is, even as we
suppose thaewater' and ' twater' are notlogically exchangeable with
coextensive expressions salva veritate, we have a difference between
their thought (contentsY' (OB 145). So while Putnam thinks that the
different extensions of'water' on Earth and Twin Earth do not impIy
the existence of different intensions, Burge has shown this supposi
tion to be mistaken. liThe difference in their mental states and events
seems to be a product primarily of differences in their physical
envirorunents - in the mental states of their fellows and conventional
meanings of words they and their fellows emplot' (OB 146).
Now we can directly address the problem of indexicality, and
why Burge thinks that this is a major reason for Putnam to leave the
force of his own arguments out to dry. While Puhlam thinks that
natural kind terms like Iwater' have an indexical component, Burge
does not want to allow this conclusion. In fact, Burge states, 11 that
'water interpreted as it is in English, or as we English speakers
standardly interpret it, does not shift extension from context to
context ... The extension of Iwater' as interpreted in English in all
non-oblique contexts, is (roughly) the set of all aggregates of H20
molecules. There is nothing at all indexical about 'water' in the
customary sense oeindexicall l l (OB 146). Burge continues by criticiz
ing some of the grounds that Putnam uses to claim that' water' is
indexical. One of these is:
I

II

l

l

1. 'Water' is stuff that bears a certain similarity relation to the
water around here. Water at another time or in another place
or even in another possible world has to bear the relation
[same-liquid] to our 'water' in order to be water. (T.Mlv119)
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The main criticism that Burge has with this conception of the
indexicality of 'water' is a simple one. If GlennE was to visit Twin
Earth and ostensively indicate the XYZ in the stream, that is, call 'that
stuff there 'water,' for Putnam this would be a true declaration.
However, by Putnam's previous account of Twin Earth, there is no
'water' [H2O] there. And there is no reason why an English speaker
should not be held to this account when he visits Twin Earth. The
problem is that although 'here' shifts its extension with context,
'water' does not. Water lacks the indexicality of 'here'lf (OB 147).
I continually have been referring to the confusion that results
when we allow Putnam to claim that natural kind terms have an
indexical component. For Burge, allowing this claim to stand "has
large implications for our understanding of mentalistic notions" (0B
149). It is the case, for Burge, that the identity of one's mental
contents, states, and events is not independent of the nature of one's
physical and social environment" (ibid.). It seems hard to accept that
'water' is indexical. Suppose you or I were to be instantaneously
switched with our Twin Earth doppelganger. When we, on Twin
Earth, asked for a glass of 'water,' we would not be making any
reference to 'twater.' The two are different substances, and our
unwitting indication of 'twater' when we mean 'water,' evenifitgoes
unnoticed, points out the non~indexicality of natural ki~d terms.
II

/I

V. Conclusions
The last relevant section of the Burge piece, "Other Bodies," can
be viewed as showinghow propositional attitudes do indeed I fix' the
extensions of the relevant terms. To radically oversimplify this point
before I end, I shall quote Burge once more, "[Glenn's] attitude
contents involving relevant natural kind notions~- and thus, all his
relevant attitudes--are individuated by reference to other entities.
His having these attitudes in the relevant circumstances entails the
existence of other entities" (OB 155). This quotation makes more
sense once I tell you that Burge previously noted that even in
presupposing counterfactual situations we must make use of the
actual existence of things. This seems to me somewhat like a rigid
designator conception. We can imagine, at least momentarily, a
world where Monica Lewinsky did not exist, or had blond hair, or a
small nose, etc. However, for us to be able to do so hinges on our
knowledge that Monica Lewinsky did in fact exist here and now. To
return to section II, Burge does not find Putnam's notion of narrow
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content states acceptable. It is umealistic to suppose that one can
hold a belief P, where P is a belief about x and x has no existent
counterpart in the world that we are part of. That is, there could be
no x that the holder of belief P has heard spoken of in the world,
experienced, etc.
The twofold thesis of this paper is that Putnam was incorrect to
accept the existence of narrow content mental states and that Burge,
in exposing this error, can explain why mental content is not in the
hands of the individuaL For Burge, there cannot be a difference in
extension without a correspondent difference in propositional con
tent-clause beliefs. Burge is correct to see that Putnam's false beliefs,
that there can be narrow content states and that natural kind terms
have an indexical component, obscure the true force of the Twin
Earth thought experiment. Putnam radically underestimates the
importance of having the sort of social environment like Hank, in our
arthritis example does, to obtain correct knowledge of the meaning
of a term and the correspondent mental content. The conceivability
ofHank2 to refer to "arthritis" as Hank does in our world, or to have
the sort of mental content that we do regarding arthritis is niL For
Burge, the intricate social interplay between speakers helps account
for mental content. It is because Burge wants to prove this that he
discounts the possibility of narrow mental content. All mental
content for Burge is broad, in the sense that it is inextricably related
to both the physical and social environments. To end, I hope that this
paper has explicated the differences to be found in Putnam's revision
of the traditional principles of meaning [A and B] that comes out of
the Twin Earth examples, and Burge's reinterpreta tion of these. For
Burget mental contentjustain't determined by the things in our head.
It is also determined, to a larger degree than Putnam admits, by the
actual things in the external world and our sodal networks.
NOTES

1.This view is not really held by Putnam anymore t but for the sake of the
arguments in my paper I needed these arguments as foils for Burge.
2. The 'principle of charity' was the label used by Daniel Dennett in his article
IITrue Believers as Intentional Systems in The Nature of Mind (New York:
Oxford University Press t 1991). D. Rosenthat ed., to explain why we must
attribute largely true beliefs to other persons in order to make rational sense of
their actions.
ll
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